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ABSTRACT- When Bluetooth devices come within the 
range of another, an electronic conversation takes place 
to determine whether the devices in range are known or 
whether one needs to control the other. Most Bluetooth 
devices do not require any form of user interaction for 
this to occur. If devices within range are known to one 
another, the devices automatically form a network-
known as a pairing. 
            Authentication addresses the identity of each 
communicating device. The sender sends an encrypted 
authentication request frame to the receiver. The 
receiver sends an encrypted challenge frame back to the 
sender. Both perform a predefined algorithm. The 
sender sends its findings back to the receiver, which in 
turn either allows or denies the connection. 
           There are three different functions for 
authentication in Bluetooth-E1, E2, and E3. E1 is used 
when encrypting the authorization challenge-response 
values.E2 is for generating different link keys.E3 is used 
when creating the encryption key. 
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GENERALIZATION OF INITIALIZATION 
KEY: 
       The creation of an initialization key is used when 
no other keys are present. The key is derived from a 
random number, a PIN, length of the PIN and a unit’s 
hardware address. The PIN code can either be a 
factory value or the user can enter a maximum of 16 
octets.  
GENERALIZATION OF LINK KEY AND LINK 
KEY EXCHANGE: 
        When a link key is established between two 
units they will use that key for authentication. A link 
key is 128 bits long and a shared between two or 
more units, a new link key can be derived whenever 
to improve security.  
Each device creates a random no and 
encrypts it together with its hardware address and 
produces initialization key.. 
AUTHENTICATION: 
The Bluetooth authentication procedure is 
based on a challenge-response scheme. Two devices 
interacting in an authentication procedure are referred 
to as the claimant and the verifier. The verifier is the 
blue tooth device validating the identity of another 
device. The claimant is the device attempting to 
prove its identity. 
 The challenge-response protocol validates 
devices by verifying the knowledge of a secret key- a 
Bluetooth link key. The steps in the authentication 
process are the following: 
• Step1: the claimant transmits its 48-bit 
address (BD_ADD) to the verifier. 
• Step2: the verifier transmits a 128-bit 
random challenge (AU_RAND) to the 
claimant. 
• Step3: the verifier uses the E1 algorithm to 
compute an authentication response using 
the address, link key and random 
challenge as inputs.  
• Step4: the claimant returns the computed 
response SRES, to the verifier. 
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• Step5: the verifier compares the SRES from 
the claimant with the SRES that it computes. 
• Step 6: if the two 32-bit SRES values are 
equal, the verifier will continue connection 
establishment. 
.The E1 authentication function used for the 
validation is based on the SAFER+ algorithm. 
 
 
Fig1: Authentication Process 
PROBLEM IN THE CURRENT SYSTEM: 
 
Fig2: Message in Existing Authentication Process 
When the connection is made between the Bluetooth 
devices, an intruder device can be there in different 
ways. An intruder can act as the fake device in the 
different roles. The fake device can behave as false 
slave or false master. Similarly the intruder can be a 
active intruder or passive one. It can continue the 
connections to the both communicating devices or 
detach the one end messages sent by intruder C is 
shown in Fig.3. 
In the existing authentication scheme of Bluetooth 
technology mutual authentication is performed. 
First one device sends the random number for 
authentication to the device second, 
Then the second device sends the response and sends 
another random number for the verification of first 
device. Then the first device sends the response of 
random number send b second device. In this way the 
identification of both the devices is done. 
In the above figure .2, device A sends a random 
number R1 to device B for authentication of device 
B.  Then the device B sends the random number R2 
and the device B sends the ResR2 to device B 
Behavior of intruder C in existing scheme: 
 
Fig3:Message in Existing Authentication Process 
by the intruder 
Suppose an intruder C wants to make connection in 
between the both devices A and B. 
• Device A sends random number R1 to the 
fake device B. 
• Fake device B now behaves as fake device 
B. 
• Now the device B sends the response Res 
R1 to fake device A. 
• Intruder’s C sends the authentication 
random number R2 to fake device A. 
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• The intruder C sends the random number R2 
to device A. 
• The device A sends the Res R2 to fake 
device. 
• The fake device now sends the same 
response Resr2 to device. 
Hence in this way the intruder device makes the 
connection with the devices A and b. 
IMPROVED AUTHENTICATION METHOD: 
In the authentication scheme, mutual 
authentication is performed exclusively between 
master and slave. First, one is authenticated with the 
AU_RAND (challenge) and SRES (response) 
exchange. Then the other is 
 
 
 
 
Authenticated again using a challenge 
response mechanism. We propose to change this 
authentication message exchanges in a form such that 
first both parties exchange their authentication 
random value and claimant does not sends its 
response before getting the response from the 
verifier. In this method, the attacker cannot obtain 
SRES vale from the other party. Since the attacker 
acts as a verifier in both piconets, its authentication 
challenge is responded with another authentication 
challenge from the genuine entities. 
      With the improved authentication method, if 
messages exchanged in a nested form such that first 
both parties exchange their random values and 
claimant does not sends its response from the verifier. 
The messages are shown as below: 
Now there are two case in this authentication 
procedure: 
? When the request for connection is generated 
from the intruder device C to device A. 
? When the request for connection is made from 
the device A to device C. 
Case 1: request from c to A: 
In this case when the intruder C will initiate the 
connection establishment procedure with device A. 
• The fake device sends the random number 
R1 to device A. 
• The device A does not sends the response 
for R1. 
• It sends the another random number R2 to 
fake device B for authentication and waits 
for the response for R2. 
            Suppose the fake device is trying to get the 
response from device B. It sends the same random 
number to devices B. 
         The device does not sends the response of 
R2,firstly it verifies the fake device A and sends the 
one another random number R3  waits for the 
response of R3 from fake device. 
Hence in this case the attacker cant’ involve itself 
into the devices A and B. 
 
    Case 2: Request from A to C: in this case when 
the request is made from device A. The following 
messages are exchanged between the devices A, C 
and B 
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 First the authentication random number R1 is sent by 
device A. 
• The device C sends the same random 
number R1 to device B. 
• The device C does not send the response of 
R1,it sends the another random number R2 
to fake device A for authentication. 
• The device C transmits the random number 
R2 to device A and waits for the response of 
R2 from A. 
• The device A gives the response ‘ResR2’ of 
R2. 
• The device C gives theResR2 to device b. 
• The device B sends the ResR1in response to 
the number R1 to device C. 
• The resR1 is sent as it is to device A by the 
device C. 
       Hence the connection is made between the 
devices A and C and C and B, but this is only 
possible only when the request is initiated by the 
device A and simultaneously there is a connection 
between the device A and B. 
Integrity is maintained, but the confidentiality is 
disturbed. 
IMPLEMENTING MORE SECURITY FOR 
RANDOM NUMBER EXCHANGE: 
The scheme implemented in case 2 was 
insecure obviously. So by implementing the 
encryption in key exchange we can have a new 
improved authenticated system with more security to 
avoid the above said intruder attack. 
 
                PLAUSIBLE EXCHANGE 
DIFFIE-HELLMAN KEY EXCHANGE: 
 Device A selects a random number R1 such 
that    R1 < P a prime number which is having α as its 
primitive root and calculates S1= aR1mod p. Similarly 
device Selects R2 such that R2 < p and calculates S2 
= aR2mod p. Each side keeps the R value Private and 
S values Public. 
Device A computes K = S2R1mod p and B 
computes K = s1R2 mod p so the produce identical 
results. 
So even though the intruder knows the P, S 
and α value they can predict the S1 and S2 values. 
But they couldn’t predict the original random 
number. 
Device  A Fake B       Fake A 
      Intruder 
 Device B 
  R1        S1             
                                         S1                             R1     
                                                            S2          R2     
R2          S2            
Res R2    
                                                                 Res R1 
PROCEDURE TO EXCHANGE KEYS: 
Device A:  S1= aR1mod p 
Device B: S2 = aR2mod p 
Device A:  K = s2R1mod p 
Device B:  K = s1R2 mod p 
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ADVANTAGES: 
• This algorithm uses the discrete logarithmic 
function, which is an irreversible function 
and it can not be easily decrypted. 
• The secret integers S1 and S2 are discarded 
at the end of the session. Therefore, Diffie-
Hellman key exchange by itself trivially 
achieves perfect forward secrecy because no 
long-term private keying material exists to 
be disclosed. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
              While Bluetooth has several nice features, it 
fails to be a secure replacement of wires. As we have 
shown that Bluetooth is susceptible to the attacks by 
intruders independent of security mechanisms. If an 
unknown device wants to make connections or 
request for a service. The proper authentication is 
followed by authorization and encryption, but 
authentication process should be such that unknown 
device would not get response of any random number 
until and unless it will give response to the random 
number which it wants to make the connections. 
      If we give the provision that not any single 
slave will response until it verifies the identity of 
other device and another method is that one device 
can estimate the delay by observing the response time 
given by the verifier, so in this way we an check the 
identity of the device and can improve the security. 
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